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COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding Palazzolo's
claims asserting the application of Rhode Island's wetlands regulations
took his property without compensation were ripe; the acquisition of
title did not bar the claims; and Palazzolo failed to establish a
deprivation of all economic value).
Palazzolo owned land in Rhode Island and Rhode Island law
designated most of his property as coastal wetlands. In 1983, Palazzolo
applied to the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council
("Council") for permission to construct a wooden bulkhead and fill his
The Council rejected the application,
entire marshland area.
concluding it would conflict with the Coastal Resource Management
Program ("CRMP"). In 1985, Palazzolo applied to the Council for
permission to fill part of the property's wetlands in order to build a
private beach club. The Council rejected this application as well,
ruling that the proposal did not satisfy the standards for obtaining a
"special exception" to fill salt marsh, whereby the proposed activity
must serve a compelling public purpose.
In response, Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action
asserting that the state's wetlands regulation, as applied by the Council
to his parcel, had taken the property without compensation in
violation of the Takings Clause of the Constitution. Palazzolo sought
review by the United States Supreme Court, contending the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island erred in rejecting his takings claims.
A takings claim challenging application of land-use regulations is
not ripe unless the agency charged with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding their application to the
property as issue. A final decision does not occur until the acting
agency determines the extent of permitted development on the land.
The Supreme Court held that the Council made a final decision when
it denied Palazzolo's 1983 and 1985 applications. Thus, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court erred in ruling that, notwithstanding those
denials, doubt remained as to the extent of development the Council
would allow on Palazzolo's parcel due to his failure to explore other
uses for the property that would involve filling substantially less
wetlands.
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A landowner may not establish a taking before the land-use
authority has the opportunity to decide and explain the reach of a
challenged regulation. Yet, once it becomes clear that the permissible
uses of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a
takings claim is likely to have ripened. Here, the Council's decisions
make plain that it interpreted its regulations to bar petitioner from
engaging in any filling or development on the wetlands.
Contrary to the state supreme court's ruling, Palazzolo's claim
could not fail under the government's ripeness claim by virtue of his
failure to seek permission for a use of the property that would involve
development only of its upland portion. The Supreme Court's
ripeness jurisprudence required Palazzolo to explore development
opportunities on his upland parcel only if there was uncertainty as to
the land's permitted use. There was no genuine ambiguity in the
record as to the extent of permitted development on Palazzolo's
property, either on the wetlands or the uplands and the record stated
that the uplands were worth $200,000. Thus, Rhode Island could not
contest ripeness by stating that the value of the non-wetland parcels
was unknown.
Further, Palazzolo's takings claim was not rendered unripe by his
failure to apply for permission to develop the seventy-four lot
subdivision, which was the basis for the damages sought in his inverse
condemnation suit. The Council informed Palazzolo that he could
not fill and then build seventy-four single-family dwellings there.
Palazzolo's submission of this proposal would not have clarified the
extent of development permitted by the wetlands regulations, which
was the inquiry required under the Supreme Court's ripeness
decisions.
When a taking has occurred, under accepted
condemnation principles, the owner's damages are based upon the
property's fair market value.
Next, Palazzolo's acquisition of title after the regulations' effective
date did not bar his takings claims. The Supreme Court rejected the
state court's sweeping rule that a purchaser or a successive title holder
like Palazzolo is deemed to have notice of an earlier-enacted
restriction and is therefore barred from claiming that it effects a
taking. Were the Court to accept that rule, the post-enactment
transfer of title would absolve the state of its obligation to defend any
action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.
The state supreme court's rule was furthermore capricious in effect.
Finally, the state supreme court did not err in finding that
Palazzolo failed to establish a deprivation of all economic use because
it was undisputed that his parcel retains significant value. Thus, the
Supreme Court remanded this case for further consideration of the
claim under the principles set forth in Penn CentralTransportationCo. v.
New York City.
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